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Making Trial Within a Reasonable 
Time a Right Once More 
Steve Coughlan*  
Jordan1 got it right.  
The use of presumptive ceilings to determine whether there has been 
a violation of a Charter right is a blunt instrument which eliminates most 
of the ability of judges to consider the individual circumstances of cases 
and to exercise discretion. It allows no role for what might seem to be an 
important consideration, the seriousness of the offence. Had this been  
the Court’s first attempt at structuring the right, it would seem 
unsophisticated and simplistic. 
But of course Jordan is not the first attempt at outlining the contours 
of the right to a trial within a reasonable time: it is more like the third or 
fourth. And as a response to the reality which confronted the Court — a 
reality of the Court’s own making — Jordan made the right choice in 
eliminating as much discretion as possible. 
I. THE PROBLEM ARISES 
Trial within a reasonable time case law is a fascinating study in how 
the underlying attitudes of judges can matter more than the legal rules 
themselves. I will argue here that the history of that right can be 
understood through the influence of two factors: the difference between 
individual and institutional delay; and the role and meaning of prejudice. 
The first is a distinction which the Court has still not sufficiently drawn, 
though Jordan has the effect of allowing for that distinction. The second 
is an issue about which members of the Court disagreed in principle 
through a series of cases 25 to 30 years ago, and where eventually the 
majority made what proved to be the wrong choice: Jordan reverses that 
error. When the history of the case law is analyzed through those two 
                                                                                                                       
* Schulich School of Law. 
1 R. v. Jordan, [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jordan”]. 
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factors, we can see how we ended up where we were pre-Jordan, and 
therefore why the response in that case was the necessary and 
appropriate one. 
1. Individual vs. Institutional Delay  
The earliest trial within a reasonable time cases dealt with claims of 
what I term “individual delay”. For example, in Rahey there was a 
motion for a directed verdict: the trial judge adjourned that decision  
19 times over a period of 11 months.2 In Smith a preliminary inquiry was 
put off three separate times, with the result that it was not scheduled to 
begin until 15 months after the charges were laid.3 In both of those cases, 
there was a successful section 11(b) claim. The Court created a test 
outlining a number of factors to consider (the length of the delay, the 
reasons, waiver, and prejudice), but fundamentally it was not difficult to 
conclude that these cases took “too long”. The Court was aware of how 
long it would normally take to decide a motion or schedule a preliminary 
inquiry in those jurisdictions, and these decisions took markedly longer 
than the norm. 
Matters become more difficult when institutional delay is at stake. In 
those cases the problem is that the entire system is too slow. To make a 
section 11(b) claim based on institutional delay is to argue that the norm 
itself is too long, which is a harder claim to assess. In individual delay 
cases we have a norm against which to measure: in institutional delay 
cases we do not have that. 
That was the issue which the Court first addressed in Askov, where 
the claim was based on the argument that cases in Brampton generally 
took longer to get to trial in Superior Court than they should.4 It was also 
the issue in Morin, where the claim was that cases in Oshawa generally 
took longer to get to Provincial Court than they should.5 Morin became 
the governing authority on trial within a reasonable time cases for the 
following quarter century. 
We shall say more about these two cases later, but at the moment it is 
sufficient to note that, although institutional delay is quite a different 
problem from individual delay, the Court adopted essentially the same 
                                                                                                                       
2 R. v. Rahey, [1987] S.C.J. No. 23, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rahey”]. 
3 R. v. Smith, [1989] S.C.J. No. 119, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”]. 
4 R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Askov”]. 
5 R. v. Morin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 25, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morin”]. 
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approach. The framework which was developed in Rahey and a few 
subsequent individual delay cases was applied in Askov and Morin, with 
little obvious change. That was unwise, because the problems are not  
at all the same: being able to schedule most preliminary inquiries in  
six months but having one fall through the cracks for 15 months is  
quite different from not being able to schedule any preliminary inquiries 
before 15 months. Different problems require different solutions, but the 
same analysis, now interpreted through the lens of institutional delay, 
was applied to all cases. 
So that is the first factor that needs to be considered: the shift from 
analyzing cases of individual delay to analyzing cases of institutional 
delay, without noticing that it is a very different question. Let us look 
now at the second issue, the changing role of prejudice in the section 11(b) 
analysis. 
2. The Role of Prejudice 
It oversimplifies matters to speak generically of “prejudice”: in fact 
three separate types of prejudice have been identified as potentially 
relevant in section 11(b) cases: 
Prejudice in this context is concerned with the three interests of the 
accused that s. 11(b) protects: liberty, as regards to pre-trial custody or 
bail conditions; security of the person, in the sense of being free from 
the stress and cloud of suspicion that accompanies a criminal charge; 
and the right to make full answer and defence, insofar as delay can 
prejudice the ability of the defendant to lead evidence, cross-examine 
witnesses, or otherwise to raise a defence.6 
Those same three types of prejudice — security, liberty, and fair trial — 
have been acknowledged routinely since Mills, the Court’s first section 11(b) 
decision.7 However, for the first few years — that is, until Askov — there 
was disagreement about the significance of each type of prejudice. Justice 
Lamer, as he then was, espoused the view that prejudice to the security 
interest by itself was sufficient to make out a violation of section 11(b):  
                                                                                                                       
6 R. v. Godin, [2009] S.C.J. No. 26, 2009 SCC 26, at para. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Godin”]. 
7 R. v. Mills, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]: see, 
for example, para. 150, referring to “the three interests which the speedy trial right was designed to 
protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the 
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defence will be impaired.” 
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this was what he had in mind when he argued in Rahey that “prejudice 
underlies the right … actual prejudice need not be, indeed is not, relevant to 
establishing a violation of s. 11(b).”8 
In Lamer J.’s view, other rights, such as section 7, were more suited to 
dealing with prejudice to liberty and fair trial interests. 
Justice Wilson disagreed with this position. In her view 
...[w]e cannot treat [rights] as a number of watertight compartments. They 
represent a series of rights which any person charged with an offence has, 
but there is nothing to say that they are mutually exclusive.9 
The two judges continued exactly this disagreement from Rahey and 
Mills in a series of cases: Kalanj,10 Conway,11 Smith,12 and Askov.13 At 
first blush, Wilson J.’s position might seem the more reasonable — what 
is the harm in protecting an interest of the accused under more than one 
right? And, indeed in Askov a majority of the Court finally opted for her 
approach. It is important, however, to understand the danger Lamer J. 
was trying to guard against, since it is exactly the danger which 
materialized immediately after Askov. 
His point was that prejudice to the security interest — which was 
inherent in every section 11(b) claim — is sufficient prejudice by itself: 
…prejudice is part of the rationale for the right and is assured by the 
very presence of s. 11(b) in the Charter. Consequently, there exists an 
irrebuttable presumption that, as of the moment of the charge, the 
accused suffers a prejudice the guarantee is aimed at limiting, and that 
the prejudice increases over time.14 
That was why he argued that prejudice to the fair trial and liberty 
interests were irrelevant and that an accused ought not to be allowed to 
lead evidence relating to them. His logic was simple: if evidence of those 
sorts of prejudice was allowed to make some cases seem stronger, then 
cases without that sort of evidence would begin to seem weaker. But 
such claims were not weaker, because security interest prejudice by itself 
was sufficient. Therefore, to allow evidence of those other sorts of 
prejudice risked undermining the purpose of the right. 
                                                                                                                       
8 Rahey, supra, note 2, at para. 35. 
9 Mills, supra, note 7, at para. 285. 
10 R. v. Kalanj, [1989] S.C.J. No. 71, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1594 (S.C.C.). 
11 R. v. Conway, [1989] S.C.J. No. 70, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659 (S.C.C.). 
12 Supra, note 3. 
13 Supra, note 4. 
14 Rahey, supra, note 2, at para. 36. 
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Justice Lamer proved to be correct, and this is a problem which 
bedevilled section 11(b) case law for the next 25 years. Indeed, that 
became apparent in the very next case, Morin, where the Court dismissed 
the appellant’s claim in large part based on the absence of any prejudice: 
what they meant by that was that she had not led evidence of prejudice to 
her fair trial or liberty interests. As Lamer J. pointed out in dissent, the 
Crown “has not even attempted to show that her security interests have 
not been affected”.15 More broadly, in the cases following Morin, for 
practical purposes an accused who could not show some infringement of 
her liberty or fair trial interests would almost certainly fail in a section 11(b) 
claim: security interest prejudice alone was not enough. 
That is the first way in which the role of prejudice changed: by 
shifting from simply being about security of the person to including 
other concerns. However, Morin also implemented a more insidious 
change regarding prejudice. 
Askov had sent a shock wave through the justice system by setting out 
guidelines for how long cases should take. Only a minuscule part of this 
was caused by judges granting section 11(b) applications: for the most 
part it was because Crown prosecutors seemed to go through their files 
with a weed-whacker, throwing out anything which did not comply: as 
the Court noted in Morin, post-Askov over 47,000 charges were stayed or 
withdrawn in Ontario alone.16 Although this was not the fault of courts, it 
was the Supreme Court that got the blame, and that clearly affected the 
decision in the next case, Morin. 
In some ways the decisions in Askov and Morin are extremely similar: 
both set out essentially the same framework, and both suggest time periods 
as guidelines to reach certain stages. The subtext to the two decisions, 
however, is exactly opposite: Askov had implied “be worried about delay” 
but Morin implied “don’t be worried about delay”. This is most apparent  
in its treatment of the issue of prejudice, and what it takes to be the typical 
accused’s attitude towards it. They held, for example, that: 
An accused is often not interested in exercising the right bestowed on him 
by s. 11(b). His interest lies in having the right infringed by the 
prosecution so that he can escape a trial on the merits. … This right must 
be interpreted in a manner which recognizes the abuse which may be 
invoked by some accused.17 
                                                                                                                       
15 Morin, supra, note 5, at para. 5. 
16 Id., at para. 7. 
17 Id., at para. 62, in part quoting a paper written by Doherty J. 
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Perhaps even more tellingly they held: “the prosecution may establish by 
evidence that the accused is in the majority group who do not want an early 
trial and that the delay benefited rather than prejudiced the accused.”18 
The attitude underlying these comments goes well beyond saying that 
prejudice to an accused’s security interest is not sufficient; it is saying 
that security prejudice is not prejudice at all, but a benefit to the accused.  
Two things are immediately noteworthy about his approach. First, it 
had the effect of making section 11(b) functionally limited to individual, 
as opposed to institutional, delay. Most accused aren’t worried about 
delay, it says, only some accused. But in that case the interests protected 
by section 11(b) can be satisfied by finding the few squeaky wheels who 
are complaining and moving them to the front of the queue, and then 
letting the rest of the system chug along as slowly as it likes. There is no 
incentive to deal with institutional delay. 
Second, this is a remarkably ironic result from the decision. The 
reason the Court downgraded the accused’s interests in Morin was 
because it wanted to protect a societal interest in speedy trials. But 
society cannot make a section 11(b) application — only an individual 
accused can do that, and the Court had just said to treat such claims with 
suspicion: Morin says that the right response to an accused who says she 
wants a speedy trial is “yeah, suuuuure you do”. With no one able to 
advance society’s interest and claims by an accused generally ignored 
unless they dealt with a one-off problem, the net result was that the very 
societal interest in a speedy overall system that the Court wanted to 
protect had been sacrificed. 
Looked at in this light, it can hardly be surprising that the Court found 
in Jordan, years later, that “a culture of complacency towards delay has 
emerged in the criminal justice system”.19 Morin all but flat-out said “be 
complacent about delay”. 
II. THE RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM 
1. The Gentle Nudge: R. v. Godin 
Looking solely at numbers of cases is an uncertain instrument, but is 
perhaps instructive in this context. In the five years immediately prior to 
                                                                                                                       
18 Id., at para. 64 (emphasis added). 
19 Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 40. 
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Morin (1987 to 1992) there were 320 decisions about trial within a 
reasonable time: in the five years after (1992 to 1997) there were only 
173 such cases, a drop of almost half. A plausible interpretation is that it 
had been signalled to counsel that it was not worth bringing such a claim. 
In the five years after that (1997 to 2002), however, the number of claims 
rose to 231, in the next five years (2002 to 2007) rose further to 424, and 
in the five years after that (2007 to 2012) rose again to 475.20 A further 
plausible interpretation — and one consistent with the culture of 
complacency — is that as time went on the system got slower and 
slower, precipitating a steady rise in the number of claims. 
The pattern within decisions themselves at this time can generally be 
understood as “explaining away” delay so that, like a watch you have 
handed to a stage conjurer, it is suddenly not there any more. A typical 
example is the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Florence, where the 
period between the accused’s arrest and the scheduled start of trial was 
30 months, roughly a year outside the guidelines.21 The Court of Appeal 
reassessed the trial judge’s analysis, concluding things such as that  
255 days which the trial judge had called institutional delay should 
actually be considered to be 214 days of institutional delay, 31 days of 
neutral preparation time and 10 days of defence delay, and that a 
different 329 days which the trial judge had called institutional delay was 
actually only 238 days of institutional delay coupled with 91 days of 
neutral inherent time requirements and preparation time, and thereby — 
hey presto! — arrived at the result that the delay in the case was actually 
only 14 and a half months, and therefore within the Morin and Askov 
guidelines.22 They did not reassess, but did implicitly rely upon, the trial 
judge’s finding that there was no prejudice because there was no 
prejudice to fair trial or liberty interests.23  
If you find that explanation from the appeal court less than clear, and 
less than convincing, you are not alone. Cases of that sort are what 
prompted the Supreme Court, with its 2009 decision in Godin, to try to 
nudge the system back onto the proper course. In Godin, the trial was not 
scheduled to begin until 30 months after charges were laid, well outside 
                                                                                                                       
20 These numbers are based on a search of “trial within a reasonable time” on Westlaw 
through the relevant time periods. There might be duplications, for example, by the same case 
appearing both at trial and on appeal, but that is as likely to happen throughout the period and should 
not affect the general pattern. 
21 R. v. Florence, [2014] O.J. No. 2702, 2014 ONCA 443 (Ont. C.A.). 
22 Id., at paras. 71-72. 
23 The trial judge was quoted at para. 23, id., as having held “the defence has demonstrated 
no prejudice, above and beyond the inferred [prejudice] flowing from the delay.” 
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the limit, but the Ontario Court of Appeal found no section 11(b) 
violation. The Supreme Court of Canada overturned that result, prodding 
lower courts in two ways: that “...It is important … not to lose sight of 
the forest for the trees”24 and to remember that “prejudice may be 
inferred from the length of the delay.”25  
“Not losing sight of the forest for the trees” was an admonition not to 
become preoccupied with parcelling out every single day into some 
category, and thereby explain away delay — justify it — rather than  
deal with it. 
This point about prejudice was an attempt to restore the pre-Morin 
understanding that prejudice to the security interest mattered: 
...Proof of actual prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence 
is not invariably required to establish a s. 11(b) violation. This is only 
one of three varieties of prejudice, all of which must be considered 
together with the length of the delay and the explanations for why it 
occurred.26 
This did lead to lower courts talking about inferred prejudice, but 
frequently in the context of asking something like “was there inferred 
prejudice here”. However, to think about the question in that way is to 
misunderstand the point that prejudice to the security interest underlies 
the right: to ask, “was there inferred prejudice” is equivalent to asking 
“was this unreasonable search unreasonable”?  
Did the attempt in Godin work? Unfortunately, no. Florence, the 
example offered of the approach Godin tried to dislodge, post-dates 
Godin by five years. It nonetheless counts every leaf on every tree, and 
acknowledges the existence of “inferred prejudice” while ignoring its 
importance. The gentle nudge in Godin was not, it turned out, enough to 
set the juggernaut back on course.  
2. The Firm Response – R. v. Jordan 
The question in section 11(b) cases has always been “how long should 
it take”, and as noted that question is relatively easy to answer in 
individual delay cases: “did this take markedly longer than it normally 
takes”? In institutional delay cases, though, Morin said the answer was 
“look at the length of the delay and whether there was waiver; then take 
                                                                                                                       
24 Godin, supra, note 6, at para. 18. 
25 Id., at para. 31. 
26 Id., at para. 38. 
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into account how long cases of this particular sort usually take; then look 
at how the defence and the Crown acted this time; think as well about 
whether it’s just hard for your particular jurisdiction to give trials in a 
reasonable time; think as well about anything else that might be relevant; 
then compare that number to eight to 10 months, and if you still missed 
that time period, ask whether the accused has demonstrated any prejudice 
as a result.” That method of answering gave judges discretion to explain 
away a great deal of delay, and Morin had instructed them that explaining 
away delay was the right orientation.  
Faced with that self-created reality, Jordan said that the question 
“how long should it take” had a simpler answer: “18 months”. As I said 
earlier, this is a blunt instrument that removes discretion from judges: 
however, given the 25 years of entrenched culture which had been 
initiated by Morin, coupled with Godin’s demonstration that a more 
nuanced approach was unlikely to change things, it was reasonable of the 
majority to conclude that only a blunt instrument would succeed. 
Of course their analysis is more sophisticated than simply saying  
“18 months”. That is a “presumptive” ceiling that applies to trials in 
inferior court, while trials in superior court face a presumptive ceiling of 
30 months. That time period is measured by taking the time from the 
laying of the charge to the end of trial, and then subtracting any delay 
caused by the defence. Then, 
If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial 
(minus defence delay) exceeds the ceiling, then the delay is 
presumptively unreasonable. To rebut this presumption, the Crown 
must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances. If it cannot, 
the delay is unreasonable and a stay will follow.27  
Notably and deliberately absent from this analysis is any reference to 
whether the accused has or has not suffered prejudice. In addition the 
seriousness of the offence is not a relevant consideration.  
Broadly then, the Jordan approach requires three steps: calculate the 
total time; deduct periods of defence-caused delay; and then if the time is 
over the presumptive ceiling see whether there are exceptional 
circumstances. There are some nuances after that — for example, 
claiming a section 11(b) violation below the ceiling, or most significantly 
the “transitional exception” — but these are the primary steps. We shall 
first look at defence delay and exceptional circumstances based on what 
                                                                                                                       
27 Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 47. 
222 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Jordan said of them, and then turn to look at the case law which has 
developed in the short time afterward. 
(a) Defence Delay 
The majority in Jordan envisions only two possible causes of defence 
delay, and it is clear from the way they characterize them that they want 
to keep the lid on this consideration, to prevent it from eating up the 
right. One type of defence delay is time periods which are explicitly  
or implicitly waived. Waiver is a well-established concept, and Jordan 
sticks to the orthodoxy there: “...Waiver can be explicit or implicit, but in 
either case, it must be clear and unequivocal.”28 
The other category of defence delay is “delay caused solely by the 
conduct of the defence”. This is a more amorphous standard, but the 
majority clearly signals that they do not intend that matters should 
routinely be explained away by this factor. They stress: 
To be clear, defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges 
fall outside the ambit of defence delay. For example, the defence must 
be allowed preparation time, even where the court and the Crown are 
ready to proceed. In addition, defence applications and requests that are 
not frivolous will also generally not count against the defence. We have 
already accounted for procedural requirements in setting the ceiling. 
And such a deduction would run contrary to the accused’s right to 
make full answer and defence.29  
The kinds of examples they offer of defence delay are “...[d]eliberate and 
calculated defence tactics aimed at causing delay, which include 
frivolous applications and requests”30 or when “the court and the Crown 
are ready to proceed, but the defence is not.”31 The Court’s message here 
is not to be too quick to categorize something as defence delay. The 
presumptive ceilings are already quite high, and were set on the 
assumption that the defence is likely to do many things — seek 
disclosure, make McNeil applications,32 request voir dires — and that 
these are the sorts of ordinary procedures which contributed to setting 
                                                                                                                       
28 Id., at para. 61. 
29 Id., at para. 65. 
30 Id., at para. 63. 
31 Id., at para. 64. 
32 R. v. McNeil, [2009] S.C.J. No. 3, 2009 SCC 3 (S.C.C.). 
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ceilings of 18 and 30 months, rather than the six-to-eight and eight-to-10-
month guidelines of Askov and Morin.33 
(b) Exceptional Circumstances 
If delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Crown to 
justify the delay, but compared to the Morin approach Jordan 
significantly restricts the ability of the Crown to do so. It is only if the 
Crown can show that there were exceptional circumstances that there 
will not be a violation. In the long term there are only two types of 
exceptional circumstances, though in the short term the Court has 
recognized a “transitional” one. 
The primary sort of exceptional circumstances — discrete events — 
must meet two criteria in order to justify some portion of the delay: they 
must “lie outside the Crown’s control in the sense that (1) they are 
reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) Crown 
counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those 
circumstances once they arise.”34 
These sorts of exceptional circumstances are meant to include things 
such as, medical emergencies, but that a problem has arisen is not by 
itself sufficient:  
It is not enough for the Crown, once the ceiling is breached, to point to 
a past difficulty. It must also show that it took reasonable available 
steps to avoid and address the problem before the delay exceeded  
the ceiling.35 
Also important is that an exceptional circumstance of this sort does not 
necessarily mean that the right was not violated: it simply means that some 
discrete portion of time will be subtracted from the total. If the total still 
exceeds the presumptive ceiling, then there is still a section 11(b) violation. 
                                                                                                                       
33 See Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 53: 
the presumptive ceiling also reflects additional time to account for the other factors that 
can reasonably contribute to the time it takes to prosecute a case. These factors include 
the inherent time requirements of the case and the increased complexity of criminal cases 
since Morin. 
That allowing the time needed for these sorts of procedures to be a justification for 
exceeding the guidelines amounted to “double-counting” had been noted, pre-Jordan, 
in C. Ruby, “Trial Within a Reasonable Time Under Section 11(b): The Ontario 
Court of Appeal Disconnects from the Supreme Court” (2013) 2 C.R. (7th) 91. 
34 Jordan, id., at para. 69 (emphasis in original). 
35 Id., at para. 70 (emphasis in original). 
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The second type of exceptional circumstance is the particularly 
complex case. The Court left largely to the discretion of trial judges 
whether a case should be classed as particularly complex, though they 
did observe that a typical murder trial would not meet that definition.36 
When a case is particularly complex, however, and is delayed as a result 
“the delay is reasonable and no stay will issue.”37 
Consistent with the desire to limit discretion and give real teeth to 
section 11(b), the Court stressed that defence delay and exceptional 
circumstances are the only things which can cause a case which is 
initially above the presumptive ceiling not to be a violation:  
The seriousness or gravity of the offence cannot be relied on.… Nor 
can chronic institutional delay be relied upon.38 
Those rules govern the situation where the delay in a case is above the 
presumptive ceiling. The Court also allows, however, for the possibility 
that a stay should be issued even if the delay is below the relevant 
ceiling. In such a case the onus shifts to the accused to show a section 11(b) 
violation, and to satisfy that onus “the defence must establish two things: 
(1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to 
expedite the proceedings; and (2) the case took markedly longer than it 
reasonably should have.”39 
Those are the primary features of the new system, subject to 
discussion below of the transitional exception. Before considering 
that, however, let us see how the Jordan approach responds to  
the two problems which had led to the culture of complacency:  
the role of prejudice; and the difference between individual and 
institutional delay. 
(c) Jordan: The Role of Prejudice 
Morin had effectively undermined the section 11(b) right by its 
attitude to prejudice: for practical purposes it required an accused to 
show fair trial or liberty prejudice if she were to succeed; and it assumed 
that generally delay was not “really” prejudicial to the accused at all. 
Jordan reverses that. 
                                                                                                                       
36 Id., at para. 78. 
37 Id., at para. 80. 
38 Id., at para. 81. 
39 Id., at para. 82. 
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Prejudice is not an explicit consideration in the Jordan analysis, but 
that is only so that courts cannot rely on the absence of proven fair trial 
or liberty prejudice as a way of dismissing a claim. The majority does not 
treat prejudice as irrelevant: quite the opposite,  
although prejudice will no longer play an explicit role in the s. 11 (b) 
analysis, it informs the setting of the presumptive ceiling. Once the 
ceiling is breached, we presume that accused persons will have suffered 
prejudice to their Charter-protected liberty, security of the person, and 
fair trial interests. …This is not, we stress, a rebuttable presumption: 
once the ceiling is breached, an absence of actual prejudice cannot 
convert an unreasonable delay into a reasonable one.40 
In saying this, the majority has embraced the pre-Askov Lamer 
position that prejudice is inherent in the right itself, and therefore that 
there simply cannot be a lack of prejudice if a reasonable time has been 
exceeded: 
prejudice is part of the rationale for the right and is assured by the very 
presence of s. 11(b) in the Charter. Consequently, there exists an 
irrebuttable presumption that, as of the moment of the charge, the 
accused suffers a prejudice the guarantee is aimed at limiting, and that 
the prejudice increases over time.41 
Indeed, Jordan presumes irrebuttable prejudice at some point to all 
three of the accused’s interests, not just security. Further, to remove 
ambiguity, Jordan fixes the point at which that prejudice becomes 
irrebuttable: 18 or 30 months. As a result “the absence of prejudice  
can in no circumstances be used to justify delays after the ceiling  
is breached.”42 
This approach addresses head-on — and reverses — the approach 
which had been taken in Morin and which had undermined the right. 
(d) Jordan: Individual vs. Institutional Delay  
Jordan is particularly well-suited to dealing with the separate issues 
of individual and institutional delay. As noted above, it is easy to tell 
when a case took too long in an individual delay case, because it took 
markedly longer than the norm: the greater challenge is telling when the 
                                                                                                                       
40 Id., at para. 54. 
41 Rahey, supra, note 2, at para. 36. 
42 Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 81. 
226 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
norm itself is too long. Jordan’s presumptive ceilings are aimed at 
exactly that point: the norm is too long if it exceeds 18 or 30 months. 
But it is not just that this aspect of the test will cover the institutional 
delay cases: it is that this part of the test is aimed at remedying 
institutional delay. Under the Morin approach  
...Delay is condemned or rationalized at the back end. As a result, 
participants in the justice system — are not encouraged to take 
preventative measures to address inefficient practices and resourcing 
problems.43 
In contrast, the Jordan approach is forward-looking, since the Crown 
will see the deadline of the presumptive ceiling approaching and have a 
need to act accordingly to prevent delay: “...Crown counsel will be 
motivated to act proactively throughout the proceedings to preserve its 
ability to justify a delay that exceeds the ceiling, should the need arise.”44 
It is not enough that an unexpected problem arose: the Crown “must 
also show that it took reasonable available steps to avoid and address the 
problem before the delay exceeded the ceiling.”45  
Consider what happened in Godin, for example, under the Morin 
framework. The accused’s preliminary inquiry was scheduled for 16 months 
after his arrest, a period already well past the guideline. On the date set, 
other matters were also scheduled and heard first, with the result that 
Godin’s preliminary inquiry did not take place that day and had to be 
adjourned. It seems to have crossed no one’s mind that this was a case which 
was already well past an acceptable time and that efforts should have been 
made to ensure it took place as scheduled.46 Further, no one seems to have 
thought that this case which was already well past the guideline and was 
now being postponed again should be given special treatment in scheduling, 
as opposed to simply put to the bottom of the list. To the extent that anyone 
                                                                                                                       
43 Id., at para. 41. 
44 Id., at para. 112. 
45 Id., at para. 70 (emphasis in original). 
46 More accurately, it did not cross the mind of anyone in a position to do anything about it: 
[13] The defence was concerned about the delay. The charges had been laid in May of 
2005. With the preliminary inquiry fixed for September of 2006, the appellant was facing 
a delay of 16 months for a one-day preliminary inquiry. In late February, a few days after 
the September 2006 hearing had been set, defence counsel wrote to the court and the 
Crown requesting an earlier date. Defence counsel proposed 31 alternative dates on 
which he would be available. He received no response to this request. The Crown has 
given no explanation for why this request to expedite the matter was ignored. 
Godin, supra, note 6. 
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thought about delay, it was a matter that could be argued later. However, 
under the Jordan framework, it is now unimaginable that the need to 
expedite the matter would not be front and centre in everyone’s mind. 
So we no longer have an analytical framework which was designed 
with individual delay in mind but is being applied to institutional delay: 
the new framework consciously tackles institutional delay. No longer 
will it be sufficient to move the squeaky wheels to the front of the line — 
the line will need to be made to move faster. Indeed, the majority 
observes that the 18 and 30 months’ ceilings have been set for now, but 
are “a long time to wait for justice” and might need to be revisited.47 
In addition to directly addressing institutional delay, though, the 
Jordan framework also separately addresses individual delay. The rules 
provide potential remedies for cases which are lower than the presumptive 
ceilings. This will be based on two requirements: that the accused took 
meaningful steps to expedite the case; and that the case took markedly 
longer than it should. In this context, “should” will primarily be a 
reflection of how long such cases usually take, and so in effect a separate 
method of analysis is available for individual delay cases. 
(e) Jordan: The Transitional Exception 
Precisely because discretion not to find a violation had been limited so 
greatly, the Court recognized the danger of another Askov-like deluge of 
stays and withdrawals. To guard against that, they also created a third, short 
term, exceptional circumstance: a “transitional exception” for cases already 
within the system. In large part, this exception simply amounts to continuing 
to apply the Morin approach to cases where there has not yet been enough 
time for the practice in courts to adjust to the new Jordan reality. As the 
Court, said: “for most cases that are already in the system, the release of this 
decision should not automatically transform what would previously have 
been considered a reasonable delay into an unreasonable one.”48 
We have no clear indication as to how long this transitional period 
lasts, though it will be at least until charges laid after Jordan was decided 
(July 8, 2016) have come to trial, and perhaps somewhat longer than that: 
in any event we are still well within it. In the short term, it means that no 
case which would not have been stayed under Morin should be stayed 
under Jordan. 
                                                                                                                       
47 Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 57. 
48 Id., at para. 102. 
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III. THE IMPACT OF JORDAN 
I suggested that Jordan got it right, for the reasons I have just offered: 
it responds to the two problems which had existed in the case law for a 
quarter century. But there is a broader sense in which Jordan got it right.  
The sole remedy for a breach of section 11(b) is a stay of proceedings, 
and so that is the result of a successful application. As a society, however, 
we ought not to see “more stays” as a success. Rather, success should be 
understood as less need for stays of proceedings to be issued, because 
there are fewer violations of the right in the first place. A stay is the price 
we pay for not having been sufficiently diligent in preventing delay. 
Jordan balances those individual and societal interests nicely. 
Because of the presumptive ceilings, the entire criminal justice system is 
now worried about delay and acting to reduce it.49 But because of the 
transitional exception, the number of stays being granted has not greatly 
increased. That is, we are getting much more of the benefit without 
paying much more of a cost. 
In the six months prior to Jordan, courts dealt with 69 section 11(b) 
applications: in the six months after, there were 101, nearly a 50 per cent 
increase.50 That result is not surprising: Jordan was an invitation to take 
section 11(b) seriously again, and so counsel who likely would not have 
bothered pursuing a delay claim before were emboldened to do so. In 
fact the success rate for applications also increased, from 38 per cent 
beforehand to 50 per cent afterward. However, this increased success rate 
is not (at least directly) a result of the new framework: there has not yet 
been a single case where a judge granted a stay under Jordan that would 
not have been granted under Morin. Either the analysis reached the same 
conclusion under both the Jordan and Morin frameworks, or a stay that 
would have been granted under the Jordan framework was refused 
because of the transitional exception.51 
In other words, there have been no successful delay applications that 
would not have succeeded before. At least that is true in principle: it is 
possible that some judges have absorbed the underlying message of 
                                                                                                                       
49 Various provinces have, for example, appointed new Crown prosecutors or have filled 
judicial vacancies. 
50 I am indebted to my research assistant, Jessica Patrick, for her sterling and assiduous 
work in finding and analyzing the nearly 200 cases on Westlaw over the one-year period which has 
the Jordan decision in its centre. Her own article setting out her findings in more detail can be found 
in the Criminal Reports. 
51 This was the case in 10 of the 50 cases where no stay was given. 
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Jordan — “be worried about delay again” — and, therefore, are more 
inclined to grant section 11(b) applications than they would have been 
before. If so, that is in itself a good thing, and in sheer numbers its 
impact — 24 more stays among the 160,000 or so cases heard across the 
country in a six-month period52 — is extremely minimal. It remains 
possible that once we leave the transitional period there will suddenly be 
a catastrophe, but there is nothing to suggest that will be the case so far.53 
It is interesting in its own right to consider the patterns in the first  
six months after Jordan, though the lessons which can be learned from 
them are not necessarily clear. There is of course significant variation 
because of individual judges. For example, Jordan could not make clearer 
that the old method of trying to parcel out each day is inappropriate: 
...Trial judges should not parse each day or month, as has been the 
common practice since Morin, to determine whether each step was 
reasonably required. Instead, trial judges should step back from the 
minutiae and adopt a bird’s-eye view of the case.54 
Nonetheless some judges seem committed to applying pre-Jordan 
authorities and sticking to the old methods of calculating as much as 
possible,55 while in contrast others have understood Jordan to require a 
departure from that approach.56 Still, broad patterns can be reported. 
For example, waiver has not been a significant factor to date: in fewer 
than 20 per cent of cases has any time been deducted from the total on that 
basis. It might be that the pre-Jordan cases were more willing to attribute 
particular time periods to waiver, and that a general greater “strictness” 
about delay has changed that. It seems likely, though, that waiver will 
become a more significant factor in future, because a practice of asking 
defence counsel to expressly waive particular periods is likely to develop. 
                                                                                                                       
52 Statistics Canada, “Table 2: Cases completed in adult criminal court, by province and 
territory, 2013/2014 and 2014/2015”, <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/ 
14699/tbl/tbl02-eng.htm> shows 328,028 cases in the most recent one-year period. 
53 Pre- and post-Jordan, delay cases come disproportionately from Ontario. Ontario courts 
decide 38 per cent of all criminal cases (id.), but pre-Jordan 46 per cent of delay claims were in that 
province and post-Jordan it is 47 per cent. 
54 Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 91. 
55 See, for example, R. v. Gandhi, [2016] O.J. No. 4638, 2016 ONSC 5612 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
56 See, for example, R. v. Trinh, [2016] S.J. No. 656, 2016 SKQB 376 (Sask. Q.B.): 
[22] While I have set out, with the assistance of counsel, a fairly detailed and extensive 
chronology, I do not propose to engage in the kind of ‘micro-counting’ disparaged in 
Jordan. The lesson I draw from the majority judgment is that it is preferable for 
reviewing judges simply to begin the analysis by measuring the size of the forest and then 
determine whether it is necessary to count the trees. 
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On the other hand, there was found to be defence-caused delay in 
about 60 per cent of cases, and only in 10 per cent of those cases where it 
was argued was there found to be none. That 10 per cent is a reflection of 
the Jordan approach: concluding that the defence was not acting 
frivolously in making requests to examine particular witnesses,57 or in 
bringing particular Charter applications58 and, therefore, that the 
application did not count as defence delay. 
Where there was defence-caused delay, it often related to scheduling. 
This was argued in about 40 per cent of the cases, and succeeded in  
30 per cent; that is, the argument that the defence caused scheduling-
related delay succeeded three-quarters of the time it was made. 
On the exceptional circumstance side, the Crown has had far more 
success arguing for discrete events than for particular complexity. The 
Crown argued for exceptional circumstances 50 per cent of the time, but 
among those cases 84 per cent claimed discrete events while only 49 per 
cent argued particular complexity. A discrete event claim also succeeded 
more often: 64 per cent of the time as opposed to 19 per cent. Reduced to 
actual totals, that means that there were only four cases where the Crown 
was able to persuade the judge that the case was particularly complex 
and therefore not bound by the presumptive ceiling. This suggests that 
judges have adopted a level of skepticism about excusing delay which is 
entirely consistent with the underlying message of Jordan. 
Also seemingly consistent with that new approach is the initial 
reaction to claims under the presumptive ceiling. There was a danger that 
Jordan could have, in some instances, contributed to delay rather than 
reducing it. That is, by setting presumptive ceilings at 18 and 30 months, 
the case might have been seen as telling courts that those timelines were 
sufficient: that a court which was currently more efficient than that could 
relax! Happily, courts generally seem to be rejecting anything hinting of 
that suggestion.59 
                                                                                                                       
57 See, for example, R. v. Zammit, [2016] O.J. No. 4212, 2016 ONSC 5098 (Ont. S.C.J.) or 
R. v. Brissett, [2017] O.J. No. 298, 2017 ONSC 401 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
58 See, for example, R. v. Penney, [2016] N.J. No. 419, 135 W.C.B. (2d) 338 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.). 
59 See, for example, R. v. Trocchia, [2016] O.J. No. 4483, 2016 ONCJ 509 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. 
Oyeniyi, [2016] O.J. No. 5050, 2016 ONCJ 581 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Sedighi, [2016] O.J. No. 6736, 
2016 ONCJ 741 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Deonarine, [2016] O.J. No. 6960, 2016 ONCJ 809 (Ont. C.J.);  
R. v. Edan, [2016] O.J. No. 4279, 2016 ONCJ 493 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Hart, [2016] O.J. No. 6175, 
2016 ONCJ 693 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. DeSouza, [2016] O.J. No. 5091, 2016 ONCJ 588 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. 
Reynolds, [2016] O.J. No. 5300, 2016 ONCJ 606 (Ont. C.J.) or R. v. Santhanam, [2016] O.J. No. 6691, 
135 W.C.B. (2d) 450 (Ont. C.J.). For the contrary view, however, see R. v. Hill, [2016] O.J. No. 5482, 
2016 ONCJ 623 (Ont. C.J.). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Jordan is a controversial decision. It has focussed the attention of the 
media and the public on the judicial system, and the opinions expressed  
have not always been favourable. It is easy to see how those opposed can 
cast the decision as a way for those guilty of crimes to get off on a 
technicality, particularly as “seriousness of the offence” is no longer a factor. 
But that is neither the purpose nor the effect of Jordan. No one aware 
of the facts could deny that there was significant delay in the justice 
system — delay which did at least as much harm to society’s interests as 
it did to those of any individual accused. Further, no one aware of the 
facts could deny that, institutionally, the criminal justice system was 
content to let that reality linger. 
Jordan has changed that. Jordan has put reducing delay in the entire 
system front and centre in the minds of those who can affect the result in 
individual cases, and who can affect how the system as a whole operates. 
It has created that necessary level of concern without increasing in  
any significant way the number of accused who actually succeed in a  
section 11(b) claim. It has started us on the road to attaining the benefits 
we want, and it has paid the tiniest of prices for doing so. That should be 
seen as a success, and therefore — Jordan got it right. 
  
 
